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[1]
China is shaping the future of open-source technology - including AI
As you read this article on your computer or smartphone, you are almost certainly using open-source technology in some way. It forms the foundation of the global digital economy, from operating systems and web servers to databases and encryption protocols. While the United States and Europe have led the development of open-source technology, China is championing its own alternatives. The Chinese government has made open-source development part of its national technology strategy. Chinese companies and institutions have been active in redefining how open-source technology is being developed, licensed and deployed. China's open-source strategy could influence products and services used by people around the world, particularly as artificial intelligence becomes an everyday technology. The success of China's efforts may depend on building global trust, however. Chinese companies, backed by the government, have long been known to acquire advanced technology through intellectual property theft and by applying pressure in joint ventures and licensing agreements. Open-source technology is increasingly becoming an arena of strategic competition between countries. As a China expert and open-source researcher, I believe the countries that lead the technical and legal standards governing open-source technology will gain a competitive edge for decades to come. China's long road to open-source The open-source movement has taken various forms, from collaborations aimed at bypassing corporate monopolies to business strategies for developing products quickly. Open-source software has allowed developers around the world to reuse and improve on shared code. Linux, the core software powering Android phones and most of the internet, is an open-source technology. RISC-V, an emerging alternative to Intel and Arm chip designs, and next-generation mobile network interfaces are also open-source. Early Chinese engagements with open-source aimed to develop technologies that were free from foreign control. A government-run software institute developed Red Flag Linux as an alternative to Microsoft's Windows operating system, which the government saw as costly to maintain and vulnerable to foreign intelligence gathering. A Chinese military university later created Kylin, an operating system for the People's Liberation Army and other government organizations. In recent years, Chinese tech companies have embraced open-source technology as a way around sanctions and export controls. After the U.S. government blacklisted the telecom giant Huawei for its ties to the Chinese military, Google revoked the company's access to licensed services and apps. But Huawei used Android's open-source code to maintain its smartphone operating system. Eventually, Huawei developed an alternative called HarmonyOS NEXT and released its own open-source version as OpenHarmony. Today, Chinese leader Xi Jinping is stressing the importance of science and technology independence and self-strengthening, known as keji zili ziqiang. The Ministry of Industry and Information Technology and other government bodies have supported domestic platforms, such as the state-guided OpenAtom Foundation, for open-source technology, and Gitee, a Chinese alternative to GitHub, a popular repository for open-source software. Domestic open-source operating systems such as openKylin and openEuler play a key role in securing China's information technology infrastructure. China is also positioning itself as an indispensable player in setting global standards for open-source hardware. For example, its work on RISC-V allows Chinese technology companies to reduce dependence on foreign intellectual property in semiconductors. Open hardware standards make Chinese companies less vulnerable to export controls and bans. China's strategy of "overtaking on a turn," or closely following and then passing the front-runner, appears to be paying off. Chinese telecommunications companies, already leaders in 5G mobile network technology, are working with an international alliance to shape 6G, the next-generation standard for mobile communications. The Open-RAN standard the alliance is developing has complex implications for cybersecurity and strategic competition. Open-source AI: With Chinese characteristics? The contest over AI has moved beyond export controls of AI chips toward who leads open-source AI development. Xi is expected to discuss AI with U.S. President Donald Trump on his visit to the U.S. in September. Major Chinese AI models such as Qwen, DeepSeek, Kimi and GLM are generally open-weight, not open-source, meaning that the model software and its final parameters are made available, but not the training data and methodology. AI companies often offer models in proprietary, open-weight and smaller open-source versions. The White House and Silicon Valley remain split over the prospects of open-source AI. Anthropic and OpenAI have accused Chinese open-weight model makers of large-scale, unauthorized distillation, a technique used to copy proprietary AI models. The Trump administration and U.S. lawmakers have proposed restricting access to Chinese open-weight models, and some federal agencies and state governments have already moved to prohibit employees and contractors from using DeepSeek, for security reasons. Users of Chinese AI face risks that are not widely understood. Chinese open-weight models are designed to align with government censorship and propaganda. While Chinese models are often distributed under standard licenses, such as MIT and Apache 2.0, some impose additional compliance obligations. Moonshot's Kimi K3 model license, for example, requires licensees exceeding specific revenue or user thresholds to "prominently" display the Kimi model name. MiniMax M3's community license lists uses prohibited by "applicable laws or regulations," raising questions over which jurisdictions apply. Bilingual licenses developed under Chinese government guidance give Chinese users more access and Chinese courts more control. These include the Mulan Permissive Software License, version 2.0 and the OpenAtom Model License, version 1.0. Both are written in English and Chinese, but the Chinese version prevails in cases of conflicting interpretation, especially in Chinese jurisdictions. Open-source technology has always been global The U.S. regulates AI through a patchwork of federal and state laws. Internationally recognized frameworks may offer a better approach to governing open-source AI. Examples include the European Union's Artificial Intelligence Act and multilateral initiatives such as UNESCO's Recommendation on the Ethics of Artificial Intelligence, the Hiroshima AI Process and the International Standards Organization's ISO/IEC 42001. Open-source technology could also benefit from such governance.
[2]
The next China shock will come from open-source AI
Countries adopting Chinese models will also absorb Chinese standards and governance The writer is a fellow at the Asia Society Policy Institute's Center for China Analysis At the recent World Artificial Intelligence Conference in Shanghai, President Xi Jinping positioned China as a champion of low-cost, open-source AI. He framed this as a global public good in contrast with the US alternative. China is beginning to construct its own self-sustaining, internally reinforcing AI ecosystem -- and is increasingly offering it abroad. Beijing's geopolitical foothold in critical infrastructure is increasing and countries adopting Chinese AI will, over time, absorb Chinese approaches to technical standards and governance principles. This has come about, in part, due to the own goal that is recent US export controls. By imposing real costs on Chinese AI, export controls have inadvertently become an organising principle for China that goes beyond technological self-reliance. Now the end result is becoming increasingly appealing to the rest of the world. The original China shock came with the manufacturing revolution that followed the country's entry into the World Trade Organization. China shock 2.0 was the cleantech wave of solar panels, batteries and electric vehicles. China shock 3.0 has been the diffusion of Chinese digital technology, from ecommerce to recent AI models. China shock 4.0, now on the horizon, will be quite different. It will be based not only on the export of Chinese technology but on China's approach to innovation as a national project. The open AI strategy itself is a product of constraint. Before Chinese start-up DeepSeek threw open-weight AI into the limelight in 2025, Huawei had already made a major contribution to China's open-source development. After it was placed on the US Entity List in 2019, restricted access to American hardware and software pushed the company to build open-source software ecosystems such as HarmonyOS and MindSpore. Although Xi used the term kaiyuan, which translates as "open source", Chinese AI models should be more accurately described as open weight. Their model weights are publicly available, but the full training data is not. Open-weight models lower adoption costs, expand developer communities and allow companies to work around constraints imposed by a lack of access to the most advanced chips. They are especially attractive to emerging markets but are gaining popularity among developers worldwide because of their cost efficiency and adaptability to different workloads. Within China they are also an economic necessity. The country's old growth engines are under strain and domestic demand remains weak. For the technology sector, this creates a basic problem: enormous spending on AI models, computing infrastructure and advanced manufacturing requires access to customers capable of generating returns. With domestic revenue limited, going global with lower-cost models that spread quickly helps solve that problem. The proliferation of open-weight Chinese AI has also heightened the country's interest in speeding up AI governance and safety. Once model weights are released, they can be downloaded, modified, redistributed and stripped of safeguards. The original developer loses the ability to revoke access or update protections. This is already shaping the discussion around "selective openness" -- keeping models open while potentially delaying or restricting access to, or requiring review of, the most advanced frontier systems. Xi's ambition is to accelerate the global proliferation of Chinese technology, build a stronger strategic foothold abroad, diversify China's exposure to geopolitical risk and shape the global system more in China's favour. Granted, China's thinking around governance is still nascent. Authority is distributed across an overlapping system: Shanghai is building much of the technical evaluation infrastructure while Beijing works on risk frameworks and regulation. Organisations such as the China Academy of Information and Communications Technology and the National Information Security Standardization Technical Committee play roles alongside universities and private companies. It is messy and fluid. But the technical capacity beneath it is becoming more substantive. The momentum behind China shock 4.0 is strong. Geopolitical constraints are helping to crystallise a new and distinct model of technology governance. The next shock will not arrive in a container ship. It will spread via the principles that surround Chinese AI technologies. The world is not prepared for what will come next.
[3]
China is shaping the future of open-source technology - including AI
By Christopher K. Tong, University of Maryland, Baltimore County The Conversation (BALTIMORE) As you read this article on your computer or smartphone, you are almost certainly using open-source technology in some way. It forms the foundation of the global digital economy, from operating systems and web servers to databases and encryption protocols. While the United States and Europe have led the development of open-source technology, China is championing its own alternatives. The Chinese government has made open-source development part of its national technology strategy . Chinese companies and institutions have been active in redefining how open-source technology is being developed , licensed and deployed . China's open-source strategy could influence products and services used by people around the world, particularly as artificial intelligence becomes an everyday technology. The success of China's efforts may depend on building global trust, however. Chinese companies, backed by the government, have long been known to acquire advanced technology through intellectual property theft and by applying pressure in joint ventures and licensing agreements . Open-source technology is increasingly becoming an arena of strategic competition between countries. As a China expert and open-source researcher , I believe the countries that lead the technical and legal standards governing open-source technology will gain a competitive edge for decades to come. China's long road to open-source The open-source movement has taken various forms, from collaborations aimed at bypassing corporate monopolies to business strategies for developing products quickly. Open-source software has allowed developers around the world to reuse and improve on shared code. Linux , the core software powering Android phones and most of the internet, is an open-source technology. RISC-V , an emerging alternative to Intel and Arm chip designs, and next-generation mobile network interfaces are also open-source. Early Chinese engagements with open-source aimed to develop technologies that were free from foreign control. A government-run software institute developed Red Flag Linux as an alternative to Microsoft's Windows operating system, which the government saw as costly to maintain and vulnerable to foreign intelligence gathering. A Chinese military university later created Kylin , an operating system for the People's Liberation Army and other government organizations. In recent years, Chinese tech companies have embraced open-source technology as a way around sanctions and export controls. After the U.S. government blacklisted the telecom giant Huawei for its ties to the Chinese military, Google revoked the company's access to licensed services and apps. But Huawei used Android's open-source code to maintain its smartphone operating system. Eventually, Huawei developed an alternative called HarmonyOS NEXT and released its own open-source version as OpenHarmony . Today, Chinese leader Xi Jinping is stressing the importance of science and technology independence and self-strengthening , known as keji zili ziqiang. The Ministry of Industry and Information Technology and other government bodies have supported domestic platforms , such as the state-guided OpenAtom Foundation , for open-source technology, and Gitee , a Chinese alternative to GitHub , a popular repository for open-source software. Domestic open-source operating systems such as openKylin and openEuler play a key role in securing China's information technology infrastructure . China is also positioning itself as an indispensable player in setting global standards for open-source hardware. For example, its work on RISC-V allows Chinese technology companies to reduce dependence on foreign intellectual property in semiconductors. Open hardware standards make Chinese companies less vulnerable to export controls and bans . China's strategy of "overtaking on a turn ," or closely following and then passing the front-runner, appears to be paying off. Chinese telecommunications companies, already leaders in 5G mobile network technology , are working with an international alliance to shape 6G , the next-generation standard for mobile communications. The Open-RAN standard the alliance is developing has complex implications for cybersecurity and strategic competition . Open-source AI: With Chinese characteristics? The contest over AI has moved beyond export controls of AI chips toward who leads open-source AI development . Xi is expected to discuss AI with U.S. President Donald Trump on his visit to the U.S. in September. Major Chinese AI models such as Qwen, DeepSeek, Kimi and GLM are generally open-weight , not open-source , meaning that the model software and its final parameters are made available, but not the training data and methodology. AI companies often offer models in proprietary, open-weight and smaller open-source versions . The White House and Silicon Valley remain split over the prospects of open-source AI. Anthropic and OpenAI have accused Chinese open-weight model makers of large-scale, unauthorized distillation , a technique used to copy proprietary AI models. The Trump administration and U.S. lawmakers have proposed restricting access to Chinese open-weight models , and some federal agencies and state governments have already moved to prohibit employees and contractors from using DeepSeek, for security reasons. Users of Chinese AI face risks that are not widely understood. Chinese open-weight models are designed to align with government censorship and propaganda . While Chinese models are often distributed under standard licenses, such as MIT and Apache 2.0 , some impose additional compliance obligations. Moonshot's Kimi K3 model license , for example, requires licensees exceeding specific revenue or user thresholds to "prominently" display the Kimi model name. MiniMax M3's community license lists uses prohibited by "applicable laws or regulations," raising questions over which jurisdictions apply. Bilingual licenses developed under Chinese government guidance give Chinese users more access and Chinese courts more control. These include the Mulan Permissive Software License, version 2.0 and the OpenAtom Model License, version 1.0 . Both are written in English and Chinese, but the Chinese version prevails in cases of conflicting interpretation , especially in Chinese jurisdictions . Open-source technology has always been global The U.S. regulates AI through a patchwork of federal and state laws. Internationally recognized frameworks may offer a better approach to governing open-source AI. Examples include the European Union's Artificial Intelligence Act and multilateral initiatives such as UNESCO's Recommendation on the Ethics of Artificial Intelligence , the Hiroshima AI Process and the International Standards Organization's ISO/IEC 42001 . Open-source technology could also benefit from such governance. This article is republished from The Conversation , a nonprofit, independent news organization bringing you facts and trustworthy analysis to help you make sense of our complex world. It was written by: Christopher K. Tong , University of Maryland, Baltimore County This research was supported by a cybersecurity fellowship funded by the State of Maryland and administered by the UMBC Cybersecurity Institute. Christopher K. Tong served as the faculty advisor. Copyright 2026 The Conversation. All rights reserved. This story was originally published August 12, 2026 at 9:04 AM.
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China is positioning itself as a champion of low-cost open-source AI, framing it as a global public good in contrast to US alternatives. President Xi Jinping's national technology agenda emphasizes technological independence through open-weight models like DeepSeek and Qwen. This strategic push could reshape global AI standards and governance as countries worldwide adopt Chinese approaches to innovation.
At the recent World Artificial Intelligence Conference in Shanghai, President Xi Jinping positioned China as a champion of low-cost open-source AI, framing it as a global public good in contrast with US alternatives
2
. This strategic positioning reflects China's national technology agenda, which emphasizes science and technology independence and self-strengthening, known as keji zili ziqiang1
. The Chinese government has made open-source development a cornerstone of its technological strategy, with companies and institutions actively redefining how open-source technology is developed, licensed, and deployed3
.
Source: FT
Major China's AI models such as Qwen, DeepSeek, Kimi, and GLM are generally open-weight, not truly open-source, meaning that model software and final parameters are made available, but not the training data and methodology
1
. Open-weight models lower adoption costs, expand developer communities, and allow companies to work around constraints imposed by lack of access to the most advanced chips2
. They are especially attractive to emerging markets but are gaining popularity among developers worldwide because of their cost efficiency and adaptability to different workloads.US export controls have inadvertently become an organizing principle for China that goes beyond technological self-reliance
2
. After the US government blacklisted telecom giant Huawei for its ties to the Chinese military, Google revoked the company's access to licensed services and apps. But Huawei used Android's open-source code to maintain its smartphone operating system, eventually developing an alternative called HarmonyOS NEXT and releasing its own open-source version as OpenHarmony1
.Before DeepSeek threw open-weight AI into the limelight in 2025, Huawei had already made a major contribution to China's open-source development. After being placed on the US Entity List in 2019, restricted access to American hardware and software pushed the company to build open-source software ecosystems such as HarmonyOS and MindSpore
2
. By imposing real costs on Chinese AI, US export controls have inadvertently created an increasingly appealing alternative to the rest of the world.The Ministry of Industry and Information Technology and other government bodies have supported domestic platforms, such as the state-guided OpenAtom Foundation for open-source technology, and Gitee, a Chinese alternative to GitHub
3
. Domestic open-source operating systems such as openKylin and openEuler play a key role in securing China's information technology infrastructure1
.China is also positioning itself as an indispensable player in setting global standards for open-source hardware. Work on RISC-V allows Chinese technology companies to reduce dependence on foreign intellectual property in semiconductors, making Chinese companies less vulnerable to export controls and bans
3
. China's strategy of "overtaking on a turn," or closely following and then passing the front-runner, appears to be paying off as Chinese telecommunications companies, already leaders in 5G technology, are working with international alliances to shape 6G, the next-generation standard for mobile communications1
.China is beginning to construct its own self-sustaining, internally reinforcing AI ecosystem and is increasingly offering it abroad
2
. Beijing's geopolitical foothold in critical infrastructure is increasing, and countries adopting Chinese AI will, over time, absorb Chinese approaches to technical standards and governance principles. The contest over AI has moved beyond export controls of AI chips toward who leads open-source AI development1
.Within China, open-weight models are also an economic necessity. The country's old growth engines are under strain and domestic demand remains weak. For the technology sector, this creates a basic problem: enormous spending on AI models, computing infrastructure, and advanced manufacturing requires access to customers capable of generating returns. With domestic revenue limited, going global with lower-cost models that spread quickly helps solve that problem
2
.Related Stories
The proliferation of open-weight Chinese AI has heightened the country's interest in speeding up AI governance and safety
2
. Once model weights are released, they can be downloaded, modified, redistributed, and stripped of safeguards. The original developer loses the ability to revoke access or update protections. This is already shaping discussions around "selective openness"—keeping models open while potentially delaying or restricting access to the most advanced frontier systems.China's thinking around governance is still nascent. Authority is distributed across an overlapping system: Shanghai is building much of the technical evaluation infrastructure while Beijing works on risk frameworks and regulation. Organizations such as the China Academy of Information and Communications Technology and the National Information Security Standardization Technical Committee play roles alongside universities and private companies
2
. The Open-RAN standard being developed has complex implications for cybersecurity and strategic competition3
.Xi Jinping's ambition is to accelerate the global proliferation of Chinese technology, build a stronger strategic foothold abroad, diversify China's exposure to geopolitical risk, and shape the global system more in China's favor
2
. The momentum behind what observers call "China shock 4.0" is strong. Unlike previous waves based on manufacturing, cleantech, or digital technology exports, this shock will be based not only on the export of Chinese technology but on China's approach to innovation as a national project.The success of China's efforts may depend on building global trust. Chinese companies, backed by the government, have long been known to acquire advanced technology through intellectual property theft and by applying pressure in joint ventures and licensing agreements
1
. Countries that lead the technical and legal standards governing open-source technology will gain a competitive edge for decades to come, making technological self-reliance a central battleground in geopolitical competition.Summarized by
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