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Attack targeting OpenAI Codex users exposes AI software supply chain risks
The incident highlights how attackers can hide malicious code in software packages that differ from the source code available for review. A malicious npm package posing as a remote user interface for OpenAI Codex exfiltrated developer authentication tokens, after attackers allegedly published code to npm that was not visible in the project's public GitHub repository. Researchers at Aikido said the package, called codexui-android, appeared to offer legitimate functionality while collecting authentication tokens and sending them to an external server.
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OpenAI Codex Authentication Tokens Stolen in codexui-android npm Supply Chain Attack
Cybersecurity researchers have disclosed details of a new malicious supply chain campaign that's targeting developers using OpenAI Codex through a legitimate-looking remote web UI. The tool, named codexui-android, is advertised on GitHub and npm as a remote web UI for OpenAI Codex, attracting over 29,000 weekly downloads. The package is still available for download from the repository. What makes this activity noteworthy is that it's not a traditional attack that uses a typosquat or throwaway package to trick developers. Rather, the malicious code is embedded into a functional npm package that has undergone active development. The associated GitHub repository remains clean. "And for the past month, every single invocation has been quietly exfiltrating your Codex authentication tokens to an attacker-controlled server," Aikido Security researcher Charlie Eriksen said. The nefarious changes are said to have been introduced about a month after the package was published to the registry, likely in an effort to build user trust and expand its reach. The npm account associated with the package is "friuns" (aka Igor Levochkin). Present within the package is code that extracts the contents of Codex's "~/.codex/auth.json" file and exfiltrates them to a remote server ("sentry.anyclaw[.]store") that masquerades as Sentry, a legitimate application monitoring and error tracking platform. The captured data includes the following details: access_token, refresh_token, id_token, and account ID. "The refresh_token doesn't expire," Eriksen said. "An attacker holding it can silently impersonate you indefinitely. A stolen Codex refresh_token goes beyond access to a chat interface -- it's persistent, silent access to whatever that account can do." It's worth mentioning here that every time a user logs in to the Codex app, CLI, or IDE Extension using either ChatGPT or an API key, the login details are cached locally in a plaintext file at ~/.codex/auth.json or in the operating system-specific credential store. "If you use file-based storage, treat ~/.codex/auth.json like a password: it contains access tokens," OpenAI warns in its support documentation. "Don't commit it, paste it into tickets, or share it in chat." Interestingly, the npm package is far from the only delivery vector the threat actor uses to target Codex developers. Aikido said it observed an Android application named OpenClaw Codex Claude AI Agent (package name: "gptos.intelligence.assistant") that runs the npm package within its PRoot sandbox and sends the Codex credentials to the same endpoint. "The APK itself is small (26 MB) and looks clean on a Play pre-publish scan," Eriksen explained. "On first run, it extracts a Termux-derived Linux userland into the app's private storage and runs Node.js inside it via PRoot." "The version is not pinned, so the device pulls whatever is currently published on npm. The exfiltration has been in place since [email protected]. The package runs inside the app's PRoot sandbox, where the in-app Codex sign-in writes its auth.json. Once the user signs in, the package reads that file out of the sandbox and ships the full OAuth blob to sentry.anyclaw.store/startlog." Released by an entity named "BrutalStrike," the Android app has more than 50,000 downloads. The same exfiltration chain has also been flagged in a second Android app linked to BrutalStrike: Codex (package name: "codex.app"), which has been downloaded over 10,000 times. The remaining three apps offered by the developer do not contain the functionality. Upon reaching out to the package author on GitHub, Aikido said they initially posted a comment stating they had lost access to their npm account, only to edit the response and post a different one in which they claimed they are "currently investigating this issue internally" and that they "have started removing the affected functionality and related data." The author further claimed no credential data was shared with any third parties, without answering why this code was inserted only into the npm package build or why they needed access to the Codex tokens in the first place. The X profile linked to the author includes the domain "anyclaw[.]store." WHOIS records indicate that the domain was registered on April 12, 2026, just two days after the very first version of the npm package (version 0.1.72) was uploaded to npmjs[.]com. The development comes as threat actors are increasingly targeting real artificial intelligence (AI) developer tooling and workflows to steal credentials and burrow deeper into the software supply chain. Late last month, the Belgian security company also found that a deleted Google API key remains live for up to 23 minutes, a window that an attacker with access to a leaked key can take advantage of to gain access to user data and other APIs, including those related to Google Gemini. The median revocation window is around 16 minutes. "An attacker holding your deleted key can keep sending requests until one reaches a server that has not caught up," researcher Joe Leon said. "If Gemini is enabled on the project, they can dump files you have uploaded and exfiltrate cached conversations." Although Google first opted not to fix the issue, stating it's a "known property of the system and not a security issue," the tech giant has since decided to treat it as a P0 bug, making it a severe issue that "needs to be addressed immediately." The findings, as with a similar 4-second exploitation window previously observed with deleted Amazon Web Services (AWS) access keys, highlight how credential revocation delays are exploitable and can be used to gain unauthorized access to the cloud environments, while defenders assume the credentials have been revoked.
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OpenAI Codex tool with over 29,000 downloads linked to malicious npm supply chain attack stealing authentication tokens
* Researchers uncovered a malicious npm package posing as a Codex UI tool * Attackers exfiltrated Codex authentication tokens, including non‑expiring refresh tokens * Aikido Security also found two Android apps targeting Codex users A newly discovered supply-chain attack on npm is targeting software developers using OpenAI Codex. Codex is OpenAI's coding assistant and software engineering agent that can write and review code, fix bugs, run tests, and help developers build software with nothing but plain language input. Recently it was discovered that a tool published on both GitHub and npm was actually malicious. It is called "codexui-android", and it is described as a remote web user interface for the Codex platform. It attracted more than 29,000 weekly downloads, so it was rather popular. One of the reasons for its popularity is because it worked as advertised and appeared legitimate. The code published on GitHub remained "clean" the whole time, meaning the public source code didn't show any malicious behavior. Breaking bad However, approximately a month into its existence, the tool received an update on npm which added information-stealing code. It primarily hunted for OpenAI login credentials. When a developer runs the tool, it looks for their Codex authentication tokens and exfiltrates them to an attacker-controlled server. One of the tokens (the refresh token) can potentially allow an attacker to continue accessing the victim's OpenAI account for an extended period of time without needing the password. The implications are rather dangerous, explained Aikido Security researcher Charlie Eriksen, who found and disclosed the attack. Besides the obvious - accessing the victim's Codex sessions - the attacker can use the tokens to spend the victim's API credits, to view projects or code they're working on through Codex, and even impersonate the victim when interacting with OpenAI services. "The refresh_token doesn't expire," Eriksen said. "An attacker holding it can silently impersonate you indefinitely. A stolen Codex refresh_token goes beyond access to a chat interface -- it's persistent, silent access to whatever that account can do." Aikido also said it saw two Android apps, both published by the same account, who were also targeting Codex users. One is called OpenClaw Codex Claude AI Agent, running the npm package within its PRoot sandbox and sending all Codex credentials to the same, attacker-controlled server. This one had more than 50,000 downloads. The other one is called Codex and counts more than 10,000 downloads. Via The Hacker News Follow TechRadar on Google News and add us as a preferred source to get our expert news, reviews, and opinion in your feeds.
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A sophisticated supply chain attack targeted developers using OpenAI Codex through a malicious npm package called codexui-android, which attracted over 29,000 weekly downloads. The package appeared legitimate on GitHub while secretly exfiltrating developer authentication tokens to attacker-controlled servers. Two Android apps with over 60,000 combined downloads were also linked to the same campaign, exposing AI software supply chain risks.

Developers using OpenAI Codex have become victims of a sophisticated supply chain attack that exploited trust in the npm ecosystem. Cybersecurity researchers at Aikido Security discovered that a package called codexui-android, advertised as a remote web UI for OpenAI Codex, was secretly stealing authentication tokens from unsuspecting developers
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. The malicious npm package attracted over 29,000 weekly downloads, making it one of the more significant AI software supply chain risks to emerge in recent months2
.What makes this attack particularly insidious is its execution. The threat actor behind the campaign published clean code to the project's public GitHub repository while embedding malicious functionality exclusively in the npm package build. This discrepancy between the visible source code and the actual distributed package allowed the attack to evade detection for weeks. Aikido Security researcher Charlie Eriksen noted that "every single invocation has been quietly exfiltrating your Codex authentication tokens to an attacker-controlled server"
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.The malicious code embedded in codexui-android specifically targeted OpenAI Codex users by extracting contents from the "~/.codex/auth.json" file stored locally on developer machines. This file contains critical credentials including access_token, refresh_token, id_token, and account ID details
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. The stolen data was then sent to a remote server at "sentry.anyclaw[.]store," which masqueraded as Sentry, a legitimate application monitoring platform.The most concerning aspect of this breach involves the refresh tokens. Unlike standard access tokens that expire after a set period, refresh tokens don't expire, granting attackers persistent access to victim accounts indefinitely
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. Eriksen emphasized that "an attacker holding it can silently impersonate you indefinitely. A stolen Codex refresh_token goes beyond access to a chat interface -- it's persistent, silent access to whatever that account can do"2
.The npm package wasn't the only delivery vector. Aikido researchers discovered two Android applications linked to the same campaign, both published by an entity named "BrutalStrike." The first app, OpenClaw Codex Claude AI Agent (package name: "gptos.intelligence.assistant"), has accumulated more than 50,000 downloads. A second app simply named Codex (package name: "codex.app") recorded over 10,000 downloads
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.These Android applications run the malicious npm package within a PRoot sandbox environment. The apps extract a Termux-derived Linux userland and execute Node.js inside it, pulling the latest version of codexui-android from npm. When users sign into Codex through the app, the package reads the auth.json file from the sandbox and transmits the complete OAuth data to the same attacker-controlled server
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.Related Stories
The nefarious changes were introduced approximately one month after the package's initial publication, likely a strategic move to build user trust before activating the malicious payload
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. The npm account associated with the package belongs to "friuns" (aka Igor Levochkin). WHOIS records reveal that the attacker's domain was registered on April 12, 2026, just two days after the first version of the npm package (version 0.1.72) appeared on npmjs.com2
.When Aikido contacted the package author on GitHub, they initially claimed to have lost access to their npm account, then edited their response to state they were "currently investigating this issue internally" and had "started removing the affected functionality and related data." The author denied sharing credential data with third parties but failed to explain why the malicious code existed only in the npm build or why they needed access to Codex tokens
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.This incident exposes how attackers can hide malicious code in software packages that differ from publicly reviewable source code
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. With stolen tokens, attackers can spend victims' API credits, view projects or code being developed through Codex, and impersonate victims when interacting with OpenAI services3
.The attack represents a broader trend of threat actors increasingly targeting real artificial intelligence developer tooling and workflows to steal credentials and penetrate deeper into the software supply chain
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. OpenAI warns in its support documentation that users should treat ~/.codex/auth.json like a password, avoiding committing it to repositories or sharing it in communications2
. Developers should watch for discrepancies between published source code and distributed packages, implement stricter verification processes for developer tools, and regularly audit installed dependencies for unexpected behavior.Summarized by
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