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AI coding agents' 0-click RCE flaw could hand attackers keys to the kingdom
A zero-click vulnerability that allows remote code execution affects all of the major AI coding agents - Anthropic's Claude Code, OpenAI's Codex, Google's Gemini CLI, Microsoft's Copilot, and Microsoft-owned GitHub Copilot - and could give attackers full access to every asset and piece of data that
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A zero-click RCE flaw in AI coding agents could have exposed enterprise systems
By exploiting how AI coding agents retrieve and verify plugins, researchers were able to execute malicious code even when the agent was told to use a trusted, approved version. endif; ?> Popular AI coding agents such as OpenAI's Codex, Anthropic's Claude Code, Google's Gemini CLI, and
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Plugin4Shell Lets Repository Owners Swap Pinned Plugin Code Across Four AI Coding Agents
A flaw in four widely used AI coding agents lets someone who controls a plugin's code repository swap the plugin an agent installs for a malicious one, even when the agent locked that plugin to a specific reviewed version, security firm Air Security said on Thursday. The firm said Anthropic has
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Plugin4Shell: the safety lock that never checked itself
Air Security says one design error in Claude Code, Codex, GitHub Copilot and the Gemini CLI lets an attacker swap a plugin's reviewed code for malicious code, with no click required. Anthropic and OpenAI have patched. Microsoft has not, and Google says it never will. The AI industry already knew
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Security researchers at Air Security uncovered Plugin4Shell, a critical zero-click RCE flaw affecting all major AI coding agents including Anthropic's Claude Code, OpenAI's Codex, GitHub Copilot, and Google's Gemini CLI. The vulnerability bypasses SHA-pinning mechanisms in plugin marketplaces, allowing attackers to swap trusted code for malicious payloads without user interaction.
A zero-click RCE flaw affecting all major AI coding agents has been disclosed by security researchers at Air Security, potentially exposing millions of enterprise development environments to remote code execution attacks
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. The vulnerability, dubbed Plugin4Shell, impacts Anthropic Claude Code, OpenAI Codex, GitHub Copilot, and Google Gemini CLI, allowing attackers to execute malicious code even when developers believe they're running approved, reviewed plugins2
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Source: InfoWorld
Researchers Or Nevo, Dor Granat, and Niv Hoffman describe Plugin4Shell as a "first-of-its-kind AI supply-chain attack" that targets trusted plugin marketplaces rather than the models themselves
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. The flaw could reach approximately 90 percent of Fortune 500 companies that use GitHub Copilot, according to Microsoft's own figures1
.The vulnerability exploits a fundamental design flaw in how AI coding agents enforce SHA-pinning, a security mechanism intended to lock plugins to specific, immutable commit hashes
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. When developers install a plugin, they pin it to a reviewed commit hash—a unique cryptographic identifier that should ensure the agent runs only that specific, audited version of the code2
.The problem lies in verification. Claude Code, Codex, and GitHub Copilot pass the commit hash directly to Git to check out pinned plugin code but never verify that Git actually checked out the commit corresponding to that SHA
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. Repository owners can exploit this gap by creating a branch whose name looks exactly like the legitimate commit hash, then pointing it at malicious code3
. When Git resolves the SHA, it quietly prefers the branch over the actual commit, installing the attacker's payload while reporting a clean install at the pinned version4
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Source: Hacker News
Google Gemini CLI breaks differently. After fetching the correct commit, it runs a checkout that a default branch named FETCH_HEAD can capture, meaning the legitimate code never reaches the disk
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.What makes Plugin4Shell particularly dangerous is the auto-update feature built into these AI coding agents. Both Claude Code and Codex automatically update installed plugins by default, transforming this into a genuine zero-click attack requiring no action from victims
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.Air Security outlined two primary attack scenarios. In the first, an attacker submits a genuinely useful plugin to a trusted marketplace, passes review, gathers users, then ships a routine update so the marketplace re-pins to a new commit hash
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. The attacker then creates a branch named after that new pin and fills it with malicious code—every agent's auto-update mechanism handles the rest4
.The second attack vector involves hijacking a legitimate author's repository through previously demonstrated techniques like SkillJacking and RepoJacking, then pushing malicious versions onto every agent with that plugin installed
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.Because plugins run with the same access privileges as the developer using the agent, swapped malicious code can access files, stored credentials, API keys, cloud credentials, source code repositories, and every system the developer can log into
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. This creates severe risks for enterprise systems, particularly in development environments with access to CI/CD tools and cloud infrastructure2
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Source: The Next Web
Pareekh Jain, principal analyst at Pareekh Consulting, notes that enterprises using AI coding agents with third-party plugins face the greatest exposure, especially when those agents have access to sensitive development assets
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Air Security discovered the vulnerability in May and reported it to all four vendors in June
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. Anthropic patched the flaw in Claude Code version 2.1.179, with confirmation on June 174
. OpenAI addressed it in Codex version 0.146.0, describing the bug as Git being able to "interpret a requested commit SHA as a branch name"3
.Google deprecated the Gemini CLI and told Air Security it will not patch the vulnerability, instead suggesting users migrate to its newer Antigravity agentic development environment, which is protected from this attack
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. However, Google has indicated that enterprise access to Gemini CLI will continue with updates, though whether a fix is included remains unclear3
.Microsoft has not shipped a fix for GitHub Copilot
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. A GitHub spokesperson stated that the platform already applies restrictions preventing users from creating branch or tag names resembling commit SHAs, claiming this mitigation ensures the vulnerability cannot be exploited on GitHub1
.Air Security contests GitHub's assessment, arguing the mitigation isn't sufficient because plugin marketplaces can be hosted on other platforms like Bitbucket, which allow hash-shaped branch names
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. Microsoft Copilot supports marketplaces from these platforms, leaving it vulnerable to Plugin4Shell attacks1
.However, independent verification by The Hacker News found that every plugin in Anthropic's community catalog and in the default catalogs for Claude Code and Copilot points to GitHub repositories
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. Background auto-update runs by default only for agents' built-in marketplaces hosted on GitHub, staying off or optional for outside marketplaces3
. This suggests developers installing only from default, GitHub-based marketplaces may not face the branch-name attack variant4
.As of September 18, no CVE identifier had been assigned, none of the four vendors had published security advisories, and there's no evidence of real-world exploitation
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. The fix requires updating the agent itself—no marketplace can resolve this for users3
. Enterprises should verify their AI coding agents are running patched versions and review their plugin sources and auto-update configurations to assess exposure.Summarized by
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