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ChatGPT AgentForger Flaw Could Deploy Rogue Workspace Agents via a Phishing Link
Cybersecurity researchers have disclosed a critical vulnerability in OpenAI's ChatGPT Workspace Agents that could have allowed a single phishing link to stealthily build, authorize, and deploy an autonomous artificial intelligence (AI) agent inside a victim's organization. The vulnerability has been codenamed AgentForger by Zenity Labs. The issue has since been addressed by OpenAI as of June 8, 2026, following responsible disclosure. "A single link could hijack OpenAI's ChatGPT Agent Builder to stand up an attacker-controlled AI agent with a real employee's access and its approvals switched off," the AI security company said in a two-part report shared with The Hacker News. The attack occurs when an unsuspecting employee clicks open a benign-looking ChatGPT link, causing it to spawn a new AI agent within the company's trust boundary that does the attacker's bidding. The issue is a case of cross-site request forgery (CSRF) that forges an attacker-controlled autonomous AI agent. Agent Builder is a visual, drag-and-drop canvas that allows users to build multi-step agent workflows. Last month, OpenAI announced that it's deprecating the product effective November 30, 2026, urging users to switch to the Agents SDK. Zenity said its testing found the Builder tool to accept an initialization state through URL parameters, two of which include an agent template and the prompt to the Builder. "We found that when the page loads, the value of initial_assistant_prompt is not merely placed into the prompt box. It is automatically submitted and executed," AI Red Team Researcher Mike Takahashi said. "That means an instruction embedded inside a URL can become the first command the Builder acts on." Given that a prompt can be inserted directly into the URL, an attacker can send the URL to a target in the form of a phishing link that adheres to the following pattern: "chatgpt[.]com/agents/studio/new?template_name=[template name]&initial_assistant_prompt=[malicious prompt]." Should a logged-in user click on the link, ChatGPT opens the Builder in the victim's authenticated session and automatically submits the prompt embedded in the URL without requiring any further interaction. The attacker, however, needs to meet the below prerequisites - * A victim who is logged into ChatGPT * The victim has access to Workspace Agents * The victim has at least one authorized connector (i.e., an already existing ChatGPT integration to an enterprise app like Outlook, Gmail, Google Calendar, Google Drive, Slack, or Teams) The connector integration is necessary because the crafted ChatGPT URL passes as input a chief-of-staff template that allows the agent to pull necessary data from the workspace applications to prepare a "high-signal operating brief." Specifically, the payload passed through the malicious prompt instructs the Builder to perform the following sequence of actions - * Create an agent from the chief-of-staff template. * Attach all already-available connectors and set every connector to "Never ask" so that no user approval is needed. * Make the agent live and schedule it such that it runs every hour, turning it into a persistence mechanism. * During each run, check for emails from a specific email address whose subject line begins with the phrase "TASK," execute those tasks, and report the results back by sending an email message to the attacker's address. * Invoke Preview Mode to run the agent immediately. "Preview Mode is meant to allow users to test an agent before publishing it," Zenity explained. "In this flow, however, Preview is not just a visual preview or dry run. It executes the newly created agent against the victim's connected accounts using the approval settings that have just been configured." "In other words, the forged agent becomes a persistent operator. The original click installs it; the schedule keeps it alive; and the connected apps give it a source of commands, access to sensitive actions and data, as well as a path to return results." Armed with this capability, the forged agent can burrow deeper into the organization, conducting reconnaissance, harvesting sensitive documents from cloud storage services, and stealing passwords mentioned in Slack messages, essentially turning it into a persistent, autonomous insider capable of doing what the attacker wants to do. What's more, the rogue workspace agent can impersonate the victim to send phishing links on Teams on their behalf, which can then redirect recipients to a fake Microsoft login page designed to siphon their credentials. This scenario is troubling as it can open the door to broader compromise and other business email compromise (BEC) scenarios. "The attacker does not need the victim to click another link," Takahashi explained. "They do not need the Builder tab to stay open. Once the agent is published and scheduled, the attacker can keep sending it assignments through the victim's mailbox. Each TASK email becomes a new assignment for the agent. The agent is not waiting for another click. It is waiting for instructions." "At its core, AgentForger is an agent trust failure: the platform trusts that the user intentionally created, approved, scheduled, and operated the agent." The findings come nearly a month after the AI security company revealed how bad actors are exploiting critical LiteLLM vulnerabilities and exposed Ollama endpoints and hijacking AI infrastructure to conduct attacks against third-parties and power their own offensive operations. These efforts involve the abuse of CVE-2024-6587, CVE-2026-40217, and CVE-2026-35029. "Self-hosted model servers and agent frameworks keep getting deployed while being misconfigured and unauthenticated, on predictable ports, willing to serve any client," Zenity said. "This turns exposed AI infrastructure into convenient, deniable backend compute for offensive AI agents."
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Experts warn ChatGPT's Workspace Agent Builder can be hijacked to create malicious AI workers
* Zenity Labs found AgentForger, a flaw in OpenAI's ChatGPT Agent Builder * Malicious links could instantly deploy rogue agents that exfiltrate sensitive data without user prompts * OpenAI patched the issue by removing the risky URL parameter; no abuse detected AI agents are handy for answering customer emails, or tracking reports for newly released security vulnerabilities. But what if they go rogue and turn on the very enterprise they're supposed to support? Security researchers from Zenity Labs have found a way for cybercriminals to trick people into deploying such agents into their own tech stack. Since all it takes is a single click, the disruptive potential of these attacks is arguably significantly bigger than anything else a phishing attack could do. The flaw was discovered in OpenAI's ChatGPT Agent Builder, a feature that lets users create custom AI agents. The researchers dubbed it "AgentForger", explaining that the issue stems from an overly permissive parameter in the tool, which allowed anyone to create ChatGPT links that include virtually any instructions. Agent trust failure As soon as the victim clicks on the link, they send the instructions to Agent Builder which acts on them immediately - without prompting or otherwise notifying the victim. In theory, a single phishing email could trick a person into deploying a malicious agent that exfiltrates sensitive data or does anything else that company's AI agents are permitted to do. To make matters worse, the AI agent would persist on the infrastructure indefinitely, doing the attackers' bidding until caught. "This is an agent trust failure, and existing security controls were never built to see it," commented Michael Bargury, co-founder and CTO of Zenity. The researchers disclosed their findings with OpenAI in early June 2026, and the company came back with a fix a few days later. The bug was solved by removing the URL parameter that originally enabled the attack, it was explained. There is no evidence that it was previously discovered, or abused, by malicious actors. Follow TechRadar on Google News and add us as a preferred source to get our expert news, reviews, and opinion in your feeds.
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Cybersecurity researchers at Zenity Labs discovered AgentForger, a critical flaw in OpenAI's ChatGPT Workspace Agents that allowed attackers to deploy malicious AI agents through a single phishing link. The vulnerability exploited cross-site request forgery to create autonomous AI agents inside victim organizations without user interaction. OpenAI patched the issue on June 8, 2026, with no evidence of prior exploitation.
Cybersecurity researchers at Zenity Labs have uncovered a critical ChatGPT vulnerability that could have transformed OpenAI's Workspace Agents into a vehicle for corporate espionage. Codenamed AgentForger, this flaw allowed attackers to deploy malicious AI agents inside victim organizations through nothing more than a phishing link
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. OpenAI addressed the vulnerability on June 8, 2026, following responsible disclosure, but the discovery reveals how AI agent systems can become unexpected attack vectors2
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Source: TechRadar
The attack mechanism exploited a cross-site request forgery (CSRF) weakness in the Agent Builder tool, which allowed users to create multi-step agent workflows through a visual interface. When an unsuspecting employee clicked a benign-looking ChatGPT link, it would spawn a new autonomous AI agent within the company's trust boundary, configured to execute the attacker's commands without triggering any security controls
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.The AgentForger vulnerability stemmed from how the Builder tool accepted initialization parameters through URL strings. AI Red Team Researcher Mike Takahashi discovered that the initial_assistant_prompt parameter wasn't merely displayed—it was automatically submitted and executed when the page loaded
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. This meant malicious instructions embedded in a URL could become the first command the Builder acted upon, all within the victim's authenticated session.
Source: Hacker News
Attackers could craft malicious URLs following this pattern: chatgpt[.]com/agents/studio/new?template_name=[template name]&initial_assistant_prompt=[malicious prompt]. For the attack to succeed, victims needed to be logged into ChatGPT with access to ChatGPT Workspace Agents and at least one authorized connector to enterprise applications like Outlook, Gmail, Google Calendar, Google Drive, Slack, or Teams
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.Once deployed, these rogue AI agents could execute a sophisticated sequence of actions. The malicious prompt instructed the Builder to create an agent from the chief-of-staff template, attach all available connectors, and critically, set every connector to "Never ask" to eliminate approval requirements
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. The agent would then go live with an hourly schedule, creating a persistence mechanism that continued operating long after the initial click.The forged agents monitored victim mailboxes for emails from specific addresses with subject lines beginning with "TASK," executing those assignments and reporting results back to attackers. Through Preview Mode—intended for testing before publication—the agent executed immediately against connected accounts using the configured approval settings
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. This agent trust failure meant existing security controls couldn't detect the threat, according to Michael Bargury, co-founder and CTO of Zenity Labs2
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The capabilities of these malicious AI agents extended far beyond simple data theft. Armed with connector access, forged agents could conduct reconnaissance, exfiltrate sensitive data from cloud storage services, and harvest passwords mentioned in Slack messages
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. More troubling still, these autonomous AI agents could impersonate victims to send phishing links through Teams, redirecting recipients to fake Microsoft login pages designed to capture credentials. This capability opened pathways to broader compromise and business email compromise (BEC) scenarios.Zenity Labs emphasized that attackers didn't need victims to click additional links or keep the Builder tab open. Once published and scheduled, the agent persisted independently, with each TASK email becoming a new assignment
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. The disruptive potential of these attacks arguably exceeds traditional phishing campaigns, as a single click could establish persistent, autonomous access to corporate systems2
.OpenAI resolved the vulnerability by removing the risky URL parameter that enabled the attack. No evidence suggests the flaw was previously discovered or exploited by malicious actors
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. Notably, OpenAI announced last month that it's deprecating the Agent Builder tool effective November 30, 2026, urging users to migrate to the Agents SDK1
.This disclosure highlights emerging security challenges as organizations integrate AI agents into their workflows. The vulnerability demonstrates how AI systems can introduce novel attack surfaces that traditional security controls weren't designed to monitor. As enterprises increasingly deploy AI agents with access to sensitive corporate resources, security teams must develop new strategies to validate agent behavior and detect unauthorized deployments before they can exfiltrate sensitive data or compromise additional systems.🟡 curiosity.
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