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AI executives join call for stricter regulation of synthetic biology
Letter urges Congress to require DNA firms to screen orders to prevent AI-aided bioweapons Citing concerns that artificial intelligence will make it easier for anyone to build biological weapons, the leaders of several major AI companies -- in a rare moment of unity -- have penned a new letter urging U.S. lawmakers to impose tighter controls on firms that sell synthetic, made-to-order strands of DNA. "AI systems are improving rapidly, and alongside incredible benefits to science and medicine, there is a real possibility that the knowledge barriers which have historically prevented bad actors from obtaining biological weapons will meaningfully erode," states the 3 June letter, which is signed by the heads of OpenAI, Anthropic, Google DeepMind, and more than 50 other prominent players in AI, biotechnology, and national security. The letter calls on Congress to pass legislation that would require companies that sell synthesized DNA and the machines that make it to carefully vet orders and customers, and to keep detailed records "so that any threat that might evade initial screening can be traced back to its source. ... Awareness of traceability itself deters misuse." The push for regulation comes amid growing concerns that AI products, including large language models and specialized tools trained on troves of biological data, could enable nonspecialists to gather sophisticated information on how to construct deadly toxins or assemble deadly bacteria, viruses, or other pathogens, using equipment and techniques that are becoming cheaper and easier to acquire. Together, the combination could make for potentially catastrophic risks, such as an AI-designed pathogen that sparks a global pandemic. It's not a new concern: For decades, some researchers and security experts have called for tighter controls on synthetic biology and related fields. Those calls have resulted in voluntary agreements by many companies that synthesize DNA to screen orders for potentially problematic sequences, and by some research funders to require grantees to request DNA sequences only from companies that do vetting. Now, such screening should become mandatory for all U.S. firms, say the signers of the letter, which also include the heads of many of the major DNA synthesis companies. And Congress should act soon, they add: "Given the pace at which the underlying technology is changing, we believe the need is urgent." In the U.S. Senate, a bipartisan group of lawmakers has already introduced legislation, the Biosecurity Modernization and Innovation Act, that would give the Department of Commerce 1 year to develop new screening rules. The letter issued today could help give that legislation a push, says Hayley Anne Severance, deputy vice president of NTI | bio, a nonprofit that works to reduce the threat of biological weapons. "It's really important for us to bring this over the finish line ... to prevent the misuse of DNA synthesis," she says. (One of the letter's signers is Christine Wormuth, president and CEO of the Nuclear Threat Initiative, NTI | bio's parent group.) But regulating U.S. DNA companies should be just one part of a larger effort to blunt the bioweapon threat, Severance says. To be truly effective, she adds, other nations with significant DNA synthesis capabilities, such as China, would also have to adopt similar mandatory screening rules. The AI industry should also take steps to ensure its products aren't enabling the threat, Severance says. For instance, firms could program chatbots to refuse queries for "research and laboratory protocols that would allow nonexperts to more effectively manipulate biological agents," she says. And they could limit access to specialized tools used to design proteins and chemicals. But the challenge, Severance notes, will be "making sure good science is able to proceed while efforts to cause harm with biology are identified and stopped. It's a balancing act." Some AI companies say they are already taking steps to prevent the misuse of their products by bad actors. But the letter, which was first reported by The Wall Street Journal, is silent on whether any new biosecurity regulations should also extend to AI firms.
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AI Leaders Call for Rules on Synthetic DNA to Limit Bioweapons Risk
Macy has been working for CNET for coming on 2 years. Prior to CNET, Macy received a North Carolina College Media Association award in sports writing. The big names in the artificial intelligence industry don't always get along. We've seen lawsuits between AI companies and intense rivalries between leaders that turn into all-out feuds. But it seems that they generally agree on at least one thing: AI should not be used to create biological weapons. CEOs of some of the world's leading AI companies signed a public letter this week urging governments to address the risks that could come from bad actors using their technology. The letter encourages Congress to enact laws to improve the tracking of synthetic DNA sequences that could be used to create biological weapons. Signed by OpenAI's Sam Altman, Anthropic's Dario Amodei, Meta's Alexandr Wang, Microsoft AI's Mustafa Suleyman, Google DeepMind's Demis Hassabis and other scientists and AI lab leaders, the letter suggested legislation to require companies that sell synthetic DNA and manufacturers of synthesis machines to thoroughly check "sequences of concern and to verify customer legitimacy before shipping orders." The letter, also signed by leaders in the synthetic DNA industry and experts in national security, makes it clear that AI accelerates the threat of biosecurity threats. "While the issue is not new, the pace of progress in artificial intelligence is. AI systems now outperform Ph.D-level virologists on questions about highly technical laboratory procedures in their own domains of expertise," the letter states. "AI systems are improving rapidly, and alongside incredible benefits to science and medicine, there is a real possibility that the knowledge barriers which have historically prevented bad actors from obtaining biological weapons will meaningfully erode." The letter has a distinct sense of urgency, requesting that lawmakers implement guardrails swiftly. "This is a rare moment of agreement across stakeholders that are often at odds," it reads. "We hope policymakers will meet it with decisive action."
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AI leaders call for tougher protections against AI-aided bioweapons
Some of the AI industry's biggest rivals have put their many, many grievances aside for a common cause: making it harder for people to use their technology to develop biological weapons. In an open letter to US lawmakers, tech leaders are pressing Congress to enact rules closing what they say is an alarming biosecurity gap that could help trigger a global pandemic. Anthropic's Dario Amodei, OpenAI's Sam Altman, and Microsoft's Mustafa Suleyman are among the signatories urging US lawmakers to require companies selling synthetic DNA and RNA -- genetic material that can ordered online and assembled in a lab -- to screen purchases for sequences that could be used to make dangerous pathogens. The fear is that AI tools could make it easier to design potentially dangerous sequences, order them from manufacturers, and use them in ways that would previously have required more specialized expertise. Other signers include Meta's AI chief Alexandr Wang and Google DeepMind's Demis Hassabis, who won the 2024 Nobel Prize in Chemistry for his work on AI-based protein prediction. The letter was also signed by prominent scientists, national security and policy experts, and executives from biotech companies including Twist Bioscience and Ansa Biotechnologies, both major sellers of synthetic genetic material. The letter was reportedly organized by two think tanks: the Foundation for American Innovation and the Institute for Progress. Scientists have long warned that advances in synthetic biology could make it easier for scientists to engineer dangerous organisms or even resurrect long-dead pathogens -- work that could cause devastation if misused, mishandled, or released by accident. But that power has largely remained in the hands of skilled scientists with access to sophisticated labs, equipment, and resources. The concern now is that, as biological tools become cheaper and more accessible and AI models become more capable, barriers preventing misuse are beginning to crumble. Experts also warn that AI could help produce other threats like chemical weapons. While the letter acknowledges many of the largest providers of synthetic DNA and RNA already screen orders, it is done on a voluntary, not mandatory, basis. Detailed records should also be kept on any orders, in order to track any threat that evaded initial screening, the letter says. "Given the pace at which the underlying technology is changing, we believe the need is urgent," the letter says. "This is a rare moment of agreement across stakeholders that are often at odds. We hope policymakers will meet it with decisive action."
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AI Bosses: Our Technology Could Make It Easier to Make Bioweapons
AI may already be designing vaccines that are showing promise in initial human trials, but, if industry leaders are to be believed, applying AI to biochemistry could also have far darker outcomes. An open letter, signed by many of the biggest names in AI and life sciences, has warned that rapidly advancing AI could erode the "knowledge barriers which have historically prevented bad actors from obtaining biological weapons." Signatories included OpenAI CEO Sam Altman, Anthropic CEO Dario Amodei, and Demis Hassabis, CEO of Google DeepMind and a recipient of the 2024 Nobel Prize in Chemistry. Other signees include professors at MIT, Stanford, and the University of California, as well as two former Secretaries of the US Army and Navy. The signatories are calling on regulators to enforce mandatory screening of all orders for synthetic nucleic acids, which include synthetic DNA and RNA, and the equipment needed to make them. Researchers can order synthetic DNA online to power their research, giving small teams the ability to pursue projects that would otherwise only be available to larger institutions. However, this synthetic DNA could also theoretically be used to make bioweapons, according to peer-reviewed research. Under the proposals, manufacturers of synthetic DNA and manufacturers of synthesis machines would be forced to check customers' synthesis requests for "sequences of concern" and to verify "customer legitimacy" before shipping their orders. Providers would also be forced to record synthesis orders and sequence data to "support biosecurity investigations, tracing any threat back to its source." The letter highlights research that indicated that AI systems now "outperform PhD-level virologists on questions about highly technical laboratory procedures in their own domains of expertise," though they acknowledge that evidence on what this means for current biosecurity threats is "genuinely mixed." "Congress should act this session, and we applaud the legislative efforts currently underway," read the letter. The signatories recommend individual states should consider implementing requirements based on existing federal and industry guidelines, to avoid "a patchwork of conflicting laws." For context, lawmakers have already attempted to push through similar regulations. As The Register notes, two bills aimed at regulating synthetic nucleic acid synthesis are already in Congress. However, the House bill, introduced roughly a year ago, has not advanced to a floor vote, and the Senate bill has stayed in committee since it was introduced in January.
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AI heavyweights warn their tech could help terrorists develop bioweapons
The world's AI luminaries love to warn us of impending planetary demise thanks to their creations, and they're back with a new warning: Rapidly improving frontier AI models, combined with readily available synthetic nucleic acids, could lower barriers to biological weapons development. The open letter, published this week, calls on lawmakers to make screening of orders for synthetic nucleic acids and the equipment used to produce them mandatory. It also backs recordkeeping for synthesis orders and sequence data so that potentially dangerous activity that slips through initial screening can be traced back to its source. As has been the case with previous open letters from AI heavyweights warning of extinction-level threats from the products they created, the letter was signed by a who's-who of the industry. Google DeepMind CEO Demis Hassabis, OpenAI chief Sam Altman, Anthropic boss Dario Amodei, Microsoft AI leader Mustafa Suleyman, and other notable names appear on the letter. Outside the AI sector, leaders from the life sciences and nucleic acid synthesis industries also signed the letter, warning that advances in AI and the growing availability of synthetic nucleic acids could pose biosecurity risks. "The ability to order synthetic DNA online has accelerated vaccine development, powered basic research, and made it possible for small teams to access capabilities that used to be confined to major institutions," the signatories said, adding that synthetic nucleic acid availability has already been established to be a potential risk, and that advances in AI could increase those risks. "AI systems are improving rapidly, and alongside incredible benefits to science and medicine, there is a real possibility that the knowledge barriers which have historically prevented bad actors from obtaining biological weapons will meaningfully erode," the letter continued. Screening purchases of synthetic nucleic acids and the equipment to manufacture them, the letter argues, is one of the "best understood and least disruptive biosecurity measures available." The signatories argue that providers of the equipment and materials should check synthesis requests for "sequences of concern," and verify the legitimacy of a customer before shipping orders. Synthesis orders and sequence data should be retained as well, which would enable tracing of threats that evade initial screening. "Awareness of traceability itself deters misuse," the letter argues. "Many of the largest and most responsible providers in the industry already screen and record orders," and they want those practices codified in US law." "Given the pace at which the underlying technology is changing, we believe the need is urgent," the letter concludes. "Congress should act this session ... this is a rare moment of agreement across stakeholders that are often at odds. We hope policymakers will meet it with decisive action." There are currently a couple of bills in Congress aimed at strengthening oversight of synthetic nucleic acid synthesis: one introduced in the House more than a year ago, and another filed in the Senate in January 2026. The House measure was ordered reported out of committee in April 2025 but has seen no further action, while the Senate bill has remained in committee since its introduction. It's worth noting that the Biden administration's Office of Science and Technology Policy published a framework in April 2024 directing federally funded life sciences research to procure synthetic nucleic acids and synthesis equipment from providers that follow specified screening practices. The Trump administration ordered OSTP to revise or replace that framework in a May 2025 executive order, giving the office 90 days to do so. A new version of the framework has yet to be published. ®
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Sam Altman and Dario Amodei Agree for Once, Sign Letter Against AI-Assisted Bioweapons
You don't have to be an AI fan to acknowledge that AI can at times be a useful tool in the search for new knowledge. If any of that new knowledge should happen to be a bioweapon recipe, I think most people can agree that would suck. OpenAI CEO Sam Altman and Anthropic CEO Dario Amodei don't agree about much, but they agree that that would suck, and they signed their names to an open letter saying so. The letter itself calls this "a rare moment of agreement across stakeholders that are often at odds." Other letter-signers include Demis Hassabis and Alexandr Wang, respectively the AI heads at Google Deepmind and Meta, along with other AI businesspeople and researchers, plus dozens of scientists and policy experts. The central thrust of the letter actually has nothing to do with AI; it's directed at policymakers, and simply asks that legislation be passed requiring those with the ability to gatekeep synthetic nucleic acid to do so. Specifically, it asks that when requests come in for DNA (and probably RNA, although the letter doesn't mention it), they be scanned for "sequences of concern," and that "customer legitimacy" be checked before synthesized nucleic acid gets mailed out. It also asks that data about orders be recorded and potentially made available to investigators, claiming, "Awareness of traceability itself deters misuse." AI's rapid development just adds urgency. The letter says that because AI is progressing so quickly, "there is a real possibility that the knowledge barriers which have historically prevented bad actors from obtaining biological weapons will meaningfully erode." Wired notes that the letter was organized by two think tanks: the Institute for Progress, which is described as nonpartisan, and the Foundation for American Innovation, which is apparently right-leaning. OpenAI, for its part, has taken steps lately that seem aimed at associating the company and its leader with responsibility. It released a policy white paper Tuesday, outlining a plan for the vetting of AI models at the federal level that is more stringent than the plan in a recent executive order from President Trump. On Wednesday, Altman also met with Bernie Sanders, the fiercest critic of AI currently in the U.S. Senate.
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OpenAI, Anthropic unite on DNA screening to stop bioweapon risk
Leading figures from artificial intelligence, biotechnology, and national security are urging governments to mandate stricter screening of synthetic DNA orders, warning that rapid advances in AI could lower the barriers to designing biological threats. In an open letter, researchers and industry leaders called on legislators to require mandatory screening of orders for synthetic nucleic acids, as well as equipment used to manufacture them. The signatories argue that while DNA synthesis has enabled major advances in medicine and research, it also represents a potential weak point in global biosecurity. "The ability to order synthetic DNA online has accelerated vaccine development, powered basic research, and made it possible for small teams to access capabilities that used to be confined to major institutions," the letter states. However, it adds that this same accessibility has long been recognized as a possible misuse pathway, prompting voluntary safeguards from industry groups. The letter argues that existing voluntary systems are no longer sufficient on their own. The signatories warn that artificial intelligence is rapidly changing the risk landscape. They note that modern AI systems can already outperform expert-level virologists on highly technical laboratory questions, raising concerns that knowledge barriers to biological misuse may weaken. "AI systems now outperform PhD-level virologists on questions about highly technical laboratory procedures in their own domains of expertise," the letter says. It adds that while the evidence is still evolving, "there is a real possibility that the knowledge barriers which have historically prevented bad actors from obtaining biological weapons will meaningfully erode." The proposal focuses on screening mechanisms already used by many companies in the gene synthesis industry. These systems check DNA orders for sequences of concern and verify customer identity before shipping materials. The letter also recommends maintaining records of orders and sequences to improve traceability in case of misuse. "Screening is also one of the best understood and least disruptive biosecurity measures available," the letter states, adding that traceability could act as a deterrent while also aiding investigations. Many major gene synthesis companies already apply voluntary screening standards through industry groups such as the International Gene Synthesis Consortium. The letter argues that making such practices mandatory would ensure consistency and close gaps in enforcement. The undersigned include leaders from major AI firms, biotechnology companies, academic institutions, and policy organizations. Among them are Sam Altman, Demis Hassabis, Dario Amodei, Alexandr Wang, and researchers from institutions including Stanford University, MIT, and Princeton. The signatories describe the moment as a rare point of alignment across sectors that often disagree on regulation. "This is a rare moment of agreement across stakeholders that are often at odds," the letter concludes, urging policymakers to act quickly as AI capabilities continue to evolve. The authors call for Congress to pass legislation this session and encourage states to adopt aligned standards to avoid fragmented regulatory approaches. They argue that early action could reduce long-term risks while maintaining the benefits of synthetic biology for medicine, agriculture, and research. The letter frames the issue as both urgent and technically manageable, positioning DNA screening as a foundational biosecurity step in an era of accelerating AI capability.
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AI CEOs from OpenAI, Anthropic, and Microsoft set aside their rivalry to warn Congress AI is making it too easy to design and create bioweapons | Fortune
The CEOs of some of the biggest AI companies in the world have set aside their cutthroat competition to co-sign an open letter to Congress asking for more safeguards against a threat that their own technology has helped create. Dario Amodei, Sam Altman, and Mustafa Suleyman -- the CEOs of Anthropic, OpenAI, and Microsoft AI, respectively -- signed their names to a public letter to Congress urging the government to screen for the buying and selling of synthetic materials that could be used to create bioweapons. The letter, signed also by dozens of experts in the life sciences and national security fields, was organized by the conservative-leaning think tank, the Foundation for American Innovation, as well as the nonpartisan Institute for Progress. The letter specifically asks Congress to mandate screening for companies that are selling synthetic DNA and RNA, which the letter's authors argue could be used to create bioweapons with the help of AI. Notably, some of the companies that manufacture these materials, like Twist Bioscience and Ansa Biotechnologies, also signed the letter, signaling that at least part of the industry welcomes the regulation. "AI systems are improving rapidly, and alongside incredible benefits to science and medicine, there is a real possibility that the knowledge barriers which have historically prevented bad actors from obtaining biological weapons will meaningfully erode," the letter read. While companies selling synthetic DNA and RNA already do some screening voluntarily, the letter wants Congress to go further by making it legally required across the industry. The letter also urges Congress to require the companies that sell these synthetic materials to keep records on their orders, as well as the exact specifications of the materials sold, in an effort to help with potential biosecurity investigations. The letter comes as improved AI models continue to spread to more people at global and exponential scale. A study by Stanford University from earlier this year found that generative AI tools reached 53% of the world's population in just three years, faster than both the PC or the internet. At the same time, experts have found that publicly available AI models are able to provide information on how to create biological weapons and how to spread them, the New York Times reported earlier this month. A silent threat The government has long recognized the need to protect against deadly biological weapons. Biological agents are rarely used in terrorist attacks, and have accounted for just 0.02% of all historical attacks, according to a study in the peer-reviewed publication, The American Journal of Emergency Medicine. Yet, because they are often odorless, colorless, and in some cases highly contagious, they pose a distinct threat to Americans. Biological agents like Anthrax are especially deadly. When inhaled, Anthrax has a mortality rate of nearly 100% without treatment. In 2001, five people died and another 22 people were infected after a microbiologist and former employee of the Army's biodefense laboratory mailed several Anthrax-laced letters addressed to two U.S. senators and several news outlets. The attacks, which came just after 9/11, spurred one of the largest FBI investigations ever. Some laws already exist to protect Americans against man-made biological threats. The Biological Weapons Anti-Terrorism Act of 1989 made it illegal to develop or possess biological agents for use as a weapon, with a potential penalty of up to life in prison. After the anthrax attacks in 2001, the PATRIOT Act expanded on the 1989 law, making it easier to prosecute people in possession of dangerous biological agents even without explicit proof that they intended to build a weapon. Congress has already made some progress on improving the safeguards around the selling of synthetic DNA and RNA. In February, Sen. Tom Cotton (R-Ark.) and Sen. Amy Klobuchar (D-Minn.) introduced the Biosecurity Modernization and Innovation Act of 2026, with the goal of forcing sellers of these synthetic materials to screen both their orders and their customers while providing exemptions for "clearly non-hazardous and pose no credible threat to public health and safety." While the bill slowly moves its way through Congress, Josh Wentzel, a senior fellow at the Foundation for American Innovation, told Fortune that the letter was a good opportunity to show lawmakers that the AI industry and companies who sell synthetic DNA and RNA were equally concerned about the issue. "This is bipartisan, concrete, achievable, and noncontroversial," Wentzel said, adding he hopes now that Congress sees these parties are aligned, it can move forward with passing the Biosecurity Modernization and Innovation Act. "It's a goal among many national security experts and, crucially, something the nucleic acid synthesis industry itself has called for."
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Tech giants warn AI safety gaps could hand bioweapons to bad actors
Synthetic DNA can be used for vaccines, but it can also create bioweapons. Tech giants and biotechnology experts are asking for stronger regulation. The CEOs of some of the biggest artificial intelligence (AI) companies, including OpenAI, Anthropic, Microsoft AI and Google DeepMind have teamed up with biotechnology experts to urge the United States to pass laws requiring safety screenings of synthetic DNA purchases. Synthetic DNA refers to artificially manufactured genetic material, which can be custom-made by companies and ordered online, and delivered like any other laboratory supply. The letter is directed at the US Congress, but the issue has global implications as the material can be ordered and shipped worldwide. "The ability to order synthetic DNA online has accelerated vaccine development, powered basic research, and made it possible for small teams to access capabilities that used to be confined to major institutions," the signatories wrote. But it also creates a risk, as, in theory, a bad actor could order DNA sequences designed to recreate dangerous pathogens. Synthesized DNA has a wide range of uses. It helps create life-saving medicines, engineer microorganisms and store vast amounts of digital data. Some companies already check orders and customers voluntarily, but there is no current legal requirement to do so. The letter noted that screening "is also one of the best understood and least disruptive biosecurity measures available". The signatories also ask for mandatory record-keeping in case there is a need to track suspicious activity, and not only after the fact, but because awareness of traceability deters misuse, according to the letter. "So that any threat that might evade initial screening can be traced back to its source -- including when individual sequences would not raise concern in isolation," the letter read. The authors noted that while this issue is not new, the pace of progress in artificial intelligence is and AI systems can now outperform PhD-level virologists on questions about highly technical laboratory procedures. As systems rapidly improve, experts warn that the knowledge barriers that have historically prevented bad actors from obtaining biological weapons will "meaningfully erode". Earlier this year, researchers worldwide also warned that unrestricted access to certain biological datasets could enable AI systems to help design or enhance dangerous viruses, calling for stronger safeguards to prevent misuse. In an open letter published in February, researchers from leading institutions, including Johns Hopkins University, the University of Oxford and Stanford University, argue that while open-access scientific data has accelerated discovery, a small subset of new biological data poses biosecurity risks if misused. To guarantee safe access, the letter called for specific technical tools that would enable data providers to verify legitimate users and track misuse, such as watermarking and audit logs. What is the situation in Europe? The European Commission published the EU Biotech Act in 2025, a proposal to regulate the EU's biotechnology and biomanufacturing sectors, where it warns that "biotechnology introduces new biosecurity risks as the wider accessibility of these technologies increases their potential for misuse, posing significant health threats". There is currently no European law to regulate the purchases of these materials, and the Commission noted that divergent or absent national rules fail to offer a level playing field to competitors and weaken prevention. The Act identifies synthetic nucleic acid sequences (DNA and RNA) as "biotechnology products of concern," and proposes a new EU-wide framework. The Commission's proposal introduces some of the same ideas as the US letter, including customer verification and reporting of suspicious orders.
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OpenAI, Anthropic, and Meta Agree on This 1 Critical Decision About AI Safety
"AI systems are improving rapidly, and alongside incredible benefits to science and medicine, there is a real possibility that the knowledge barriers which have historically prevented bad actors from obtaining biological weapons will meaningfully erode," the letter reads. The scientific community has been concerned for decades about so-called dual use research of concern, or research that has legitimate scientific purposes but can also be weaponized as a threat to public health or national security. In 2009, there was even an industry-led consortium formed with the express purpose of screening synthetic gene orders and those who place them. What is new, however, is AI and the speed and ease with which chatbots can surface the information and expertise needed to do harm. In late April, The New York Times reported that publicly available AI models including OpenAI's ChatGPT, Anthropic's Claude, and Google's Gemini were willing and capable of generating detailed information about how to acquire and assemble ingredients into potentially lethal biological weapons. The findings came from experts who had been working together with AI companies to stress test various chatbots. One told a scientist how to use a weather balloon to disseminate biological material from the sky; another generated and ranked a list of infectious agents by how much economic harm they could wreak on livestock; and a third generated detailed instructions on how to create a virus that once caused a pandemic. AI companies variously responded that the chatbots were only surfacing information that was already publicly available and that it was not specific enough to cause harm, or that the newer models contained safeguards to flag harmful conversations in real-time. But the letter indicates deepening concern.
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AI Rivals Unite On Bioweapon Prevention - Meta Platforms (NASDAQ:META)
AI Rivals OpenAI, Google Deepmind And Anthropic Unite On Bioweapon Prevention AI is collapsing the "know-how barrier," and now the sector's top leaders are urging U.S. lawmakers to take action. Individuals with no advanced training can now use AI to perform complex lab methods that were once tightly constrained by technical know-how. A coalition of nearly 75 artificial intelligence leaders, biotech executives, and biosecurity specialists is urging regulators to require screening for purchases of synthetic nucleic acids and the machines used to produce them. The group argued that a federal requirement would close a key gap in the biotech supply chain while keeping the process relatively low-friction for legitimate research. The signatory list also includes Nobel and Turing award recipients, university researchers, and former senior U.S. national security officials. What's In The Letter? The group pointed to rapid improvements in AI as a complicating factor. Advanced systems, they argue, can now answer specialized lab-method questions at a level that exceeds trained experts in narrow domains. While the authors said the current evidence on near-term risk is mixed, they warned that the know-how barrier that has historically slowed bad actors could shrink. The proposal would obligate DNA synthesis providers and equipment makers to review orders for sequences of concern, confirm customer legitimacy, and retain records that could support investigations. The letter also notes that "awareness of traceability itself deters misuse." The signers said many large providers already run checks voluntarily, citing the industry's role in maintaining public confidence and reducing potential abuse. They called for Congress to take action during this session, noting that a consistent national standard should be created rather than "a patchwork of conflicting laws." "This is a rare moment of agreement across stakeholders that are often at odds. We hope policy makers will meet it with decisive action," the letter concluded. This content was partially produced with the help of AI tools and was reviewed and published by Benzinga editors. Market News and Data brought to you by Benzinga APIs To add Benzinga News as your preferred source on Google, click here.
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OpenAI, Anthropic, and Google sign letter to stop AI-enabled bioweapons, here's why it matters
In August 1939, Albert Einstein and Leo Szilard penned a letter to President Roosevelt, warning him that Nazi Germany could be working on a nuclear weapon. They urged the U.S. to pursue research into nuclear fission. As a result, Roosevelt established a committee, which later blossomed into the Manhattan Project. So, one letter had a massive impact. Also read: Meta Business Agent: Is your data private, who does it work for? Fast forward to now, and we've got another significant letter. Sam Altman from OpenAI, Dario Amodei from Anthropic, Demis Hassabis from Google DeepMind, and Mustafa Suleyman from Microsoft AI wrote to Congress. They ask for regulations on synthetic DNA and RNA companies. These firms would need to screen clients to stop the sale of materials that could create bioweapons. While their intentions appear safeguarding, it's still eerie thinking about how easy it could lead to something enormous and potentially harmful, just like that initial letter from Einstein and Szilard did. The letter from the Institute for Progress and the Foundation for American Innovation lays out something that these firms have realized: Artificial intelligence is knocking down the old barriers to entry for creating bioweapons. Once upon a time, making bioweapons required specialists in microbiology, virology, and synthetic biology. Nowadays, though? Just ask an AI, and it'll show you how to do it. Take David Relman, a microbiologist at Stanford and one of the letter's signatories; he cuts right to the chase. According to him, today's AI systems can walk users through purchasing gene sequences undetected and sidestepping security checks. Also read: At Build 2026, Mustafa Suleyman finally revealed Microsoft's AI moves Now, lots of companies globally earn a living by selling genetic sequences for various uses, like research and diagnostics. Although some perform their own safety checks, there's no universal standard. A case in point is when scientists reconstructed a defunct virus back in 2017 with less than $100,000 worth of DNA bought online. As costs continue to drop, this sort of technology is getting easier for anyone to access. That's why the letter pushes for tough federal regulations, not just recommendations, but actual laws that everyone follows strictly. It's a reasonable request. The hitch is in how Congress takes this info. If you show lawmakers that AI can help design dangerous pathogens, you're not only ringing the alarm bells; you're handing strategic data to the defense and intelligence teams. They'll view this info as a tool for developing, investigating, and potentially exploiting it. Scientists today face a situation somewhat like Einstein's post-World War II era, after he had helped develop the atomic bomb. Now, these researchers aren't mere observers; they control the tech too. This adds credibility to their warning, but it doesn't make handling the issue any simpler. We need to block harmful AI uses, particularly with synthetic DNA. Yet, the big worry is whether rules can keep pace with tech advancements. History says probably not.
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Leaders from OpenAI, Anthropic, Google DeepMind, and major DNA synthesis companies have signed an urgent letter to Congress calling for mandatory screening of synthetic DNA orders. The rare industry-wide agreement warns that AI capabilities could erode knowledge barriers that historically prevented bad actors from creating biological weapons, potentially sparking a global pandemic.
In an unprecedented show of unity, executives from rival AI companies have joined forces to warn US lawmakers about a growing threat at the intersection of artificial intelligence and synthetic biology
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. The leaders of OpenAI, Anthropic, Google DeepMind, and more than 50 other prominent players in AI, biotechnology, and national security signed a letter dated June 3 urging Congress to impose stricter regulation on companies selling synthetic DNA and the equipment used to manufacture it2
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Source: Digit
The letter addresses a stark reality: AI systems now outperform PhD-level virologists on highly technical laboratory procedures, and this capability could meaningfully erode the knowledge barriers that have historically prevented bad actors from obtaining biological weapons
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. Among the signatories are OpenAI CEO Sam Altman, Anthropic CEO Dario Amodei, Microsoft AI leader Mustafa Suleyman, Google DeepMind CEO Demis Hassabis—who won the 2024 Nobel Prize in Chemistry—and Meta's AI chief Alexandr Wang3
.The letter calls for legislation requiring DNA synthesis companies and manufacturers of synthesis machines to carefully screen orders for sequences of concern and verify customer legitimacy before shipping . Currently, many of the largest providers voluntarily screen orders, but the signatories argue this practice must become mandatory across all U.S. firms
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.The proposed measures would also require companies to maintain detailed records of synthesis orders and sequence data to support biosecurity investigations, enabling authorities to trace any threat that evades initial screening back to its source
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. "Awareness of traceability itself deters misuse," the letter states, emphasizing that recordkeeping serves as both an investigative tool and a preventive measure .
Source: Inc.
The push for regulation reflects mounting concerns that AI products, including large language models and specialized tools trained on biological data, could enable nonspecialists to gather sophisticated information on constructing deadly toxins or assembling dangerous pathogens
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. The combination of increasingly capable AI systems and cheaper, more accessible biological tools threatens to lower barriers that previously kept bioweapon development confined to skilled scientists with sophisticated labs and resources3
.The ability to order synthetic DNA online has already accelerated vaccine development and powered basic research, making capabilities once confined to major institutions accessible to small teams . However, this same accessibility, combined with AI capabilities, creates what experts describe as potentially catastrophic risks, including the possibility of an AI-designed pathogen sparking a global pandemic
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.Related Stories
A bipartisan group of US lawmakers has already introduced the Biosecurity Modernization and Innovation Act, which would give the Department of Commerce one year to develop new screening rules
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. Two bills aimed at regulating synthetic nucleic acids are currently in Congress, though the House bill introduced over a year ago has not advanced to a floor vote, and the Senate bill introduced in January has remained in committee4
.Hayley Anne Severance, deputy vice president of NTI | bio, a nonprofit working to reduce the threat of biological weapons, emphasized the importance of bringing this legislation "over the finish line" to prevent the misuse of biotechnology
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. The letter was organized by two think tanks: the Foundation for American Innovation and the Institute for Progress3
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Source: PC Magazine
While the letter focuses on regulating DNA synthesis companies, experts note that effective biosecurity requires a broader approach. Severance suggests AI firms should program chatbots to refuse queries for research protocols that would allow nonexperts to manipulate biological agents more effectively, and limit access to specialized tools used to design proteins and chemicals
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. The challenge lies in ensuring good science can proceed while efforts to cause harm with biology are identified and stopped1
.For truly effective protection, other nations with significant capabilities in nucleic acids synthesis, such as China, would need to adopt similar mandatory screening rules
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. The signatories recommend individual states consider implementing requirements based on existing federal and industry guidelines to avoid a patchwork of conflicting laws4
.Notably, the letter remains silent on whether new biosecurity regulations should extend to AI firms themselves . "Given the pace at which the underlying technology is changing, we believe the need is urgent," the letter states, adding that "this is a rare moment of agreement across stakeholders that are often at odds"
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.Summarized by
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